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Abstract 
We quantitatively assess the macroeconomic effects of country-specific supply-
side reforms in the euro area by simulating EAGLE, a multi-country dynamic general 
equilibrium model. We consider reforms in the labor and services markets of Germany 
(or, alternatively, Portugal) and the rest of the euro area. Our main results are as follows. 
First, a unilateral markup reduction by 15 percentage points in the German (Portuguese) 
labor and services market would induce an increase in the long-run German (Portuguese) 
output equal to 8.8 (7.8) percent. Second, cross-country coordination of reforms would 
add extra benefits to each region, by limiting the deterioration of relative prices and 
purchasing power that a country faces when implementing reforms unilaterally. In the 
long run German (Portuguese) output would increase by 9.2 (8.6) percent. Third, cross-
country coordination would make the macroeconomic performance of the different 
regions more homogeneous, in terms of price competitiveness and real activity. Overall, 
our results suggest that while reforms implemented individually by each country in the 
euro area will produce positive effects, cross-country coordination produces larger and 
more evenly distributed (positive) effects. 
JEL Classification: C53, E52, F47. 
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Relations.  1 Introduction
The recent ﬁnancial crisis is likely to have produced persistent and large negative eﬀects not only
on the short-run economic activity but also on the long-run potential output of the industrialized
countries. This has contributed to renew the interest in understanding the macroeconomic impact
of competition-friendly structural reforms, aimed at increasing the economic eﬃciency and, as
such, the maximum amount of output an economy can produce.
This is true in particular for European and euro area countries, notoriously characterized by
relatively low potential output. A leading explanation of the issue is that the bad supply-side
performance is mainly due to insuﬃcient degree of competition in the labor and services markets.
With this respect, several policy proposals have been suggested and implemented in the recent
past. The most well known is the European Council’s Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs that
has been followed by the Europe 2020 Strategy.1 The latter is the Agenda that the European
Union and its Member States have decided to “help Europe recover from the crisis and come
out stronger, both internally and at the international level”.2 The Agenda sets ﬁve headline
targets for the European Union in 2020 in terms of employment, research and development,
energy, education and poverty. To achieve the targets, a large array of policy measures should
be implemented over time at national and European-wide levels in the common market, ﬁscal
sector, ﬁnancial sector and external trade. In particular, the Agenda puts large emphasis on
structural reforms in the labor and services markets. The reason is straightforward. The two
markets are over-regulated and not directly subject, given their nontradable dimension, to the
competitive forces originating from the European common markets. The lack of ﬂexibility implies
a low growth rate of productivity and employment in the long run and thereby does not support
the growth of potential output.
The macroeconomic eﬀects of augmenting the degree of competition in the labor and services
markets are clear from the perspective of the euro area as a whole. However, the multi-country
dimension of the euro area, the higher degree of economic integration and the fact that reforms
are mainly decided at country level raise two issues. First, structural increases in the supply
of goods and services in only one country could beneﬁt the main trade partners by favorable
movements in international relative prices (terms of trade and real exchange rate). However,
symmetrically, these changes in relative prices would at least partially counterbalance the posi-
tive eﬀects of reforms in the implementing country, by reducing households’ purchasing power.
Second, from an euro area perspective, asynchronous reforms can limit the degree of homogeneity
in macroeconomic performance across euro area regions. As such, a country in the euro area
may have a stronger incentive to implement reforms when other countries do it and, moreover,
coordination can contribute to make euro area more homogeneous. The latter point is also
stressed in the Europe 2020 Strategy, that emphasizes the relevance of cross-country coordina-
1See, among others, European Commission (2002, 2005a, 2005b, 2010). See also International Monetary Fund
(2004), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (1997, 2003, 2006).
2See European Council (2010).
5tion to achieve better and even supply-side performance in Europe and in the euro area. The
risk is that divergent economic patterns can put strains on the single currency through diﬀerent
channels, for example through (increasing) diﬀerences in the sustainability of public ﬁnances and
trade competitiveness.3
Consistently with the above points, in this paper we adopt a multilateral perspective and sys-
tematically assess the domestic and cross-country macroeconomic implications of competition-
enhancing reforms implemented in the euro area regional services and labor markets. Speciﬁ-
cally, we simulate EAGLE (Euro Area and Global Economy model, see Gomes et al., 2010), a
large scale new-Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium model of the euro area and the world
economy.4 The euro area is a two-region monetary union having a common monetary policy
and nominal exchange rate against the US and the (overall) rest of the world (each of the latter
two regions has its own monetary policy and currency). The model features monopolistic com-
petition in product and labor markets. There is a markup between the marginal cost (marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and leisure) and prices (wages). Consistently with the
monopolistic competition framework, the markups are inversely related to the degree of sub-
stitutability across product and labor varieties, and hence the underlying level of competition.
Given the presence of nontradables in EAGLE, we can analyze the eﬀect of increasing the degree
of competition in the services sectors, traditionally considered as mainly nontradable. As we
assume that monopolistic competition holds not only in the goods and services sectors but also
in the labor market, we can compare the eﬀects of deregulating each of these markets at a time
as well as analyze the impact of coordinating reforms across sectors. Finally, the presence of the
US and the rest of the world allows for a full characterization of the euro area international trade
ﬂows.
We consider the domestic and international eﬀects of reforms implemented only in one region
of the euro area or coordinated across the two euro area regions. Speciﬁcally, we calibrate the
euro area to Germany and the rest of the euro area and, alternatively, to Portugal and the rest of
the euro area. We take Germany as it is the largest economy of the euro area (its gross domestic
product is around 30 percent of the euro area-wide product) and, as such, spillovers to the rest of
the euro are potentially sizeable.5 We take the case of Portugal as it a small country in the euro
area and it presents a considerable degree of openness, namely to intra-euro area trade. Finally,
we perform some sensitivity analysis along key dimensions for international spillovers such as the
degree of substitutability between tradables.
3See European Commission (2010).
4The model, simulated in TROLL or equivalently in DYNARE, is akin to the Global Economic Model (GEM)
developed at the International Monetary Fund (see Bayoumi, 2004, Laxton, 2008, and Pesenti, 2008) and the
New Area Wide Model (NAWM) developed at the European Central Bank (see Coenen et al., 2008a)
5It is also worth noticing that, over the last decade, the employment rate of the population at working age has
signiﬁcantly increased in Germany, to the extend of reducing the gap with the US (close to 73% in 2007). This
evolution can partly be attributed to the deregulation implemented in the German labor market in the second half
of the nineties and more notably in the 2002-2005 period (the latter being usually referred to as Hartz reforms).
For details, see Ebbinghaus and Eichhorst (2006) and Jacobi and Kluve (2006) that give a comprehensive overview
of the German employment policies and their eﬀect. Nevertheless, our simulations should not be interpreted as
an ex post evaluation of these reforms.
6We simulate the model assuming that competition-enhancing structural reforms are imple-
mented in a gradual fashion along a period of ﬁve years. Given the assumption of perfect
foresight, reforms are fully credible, there is no uncertainty and agents anticipate the overall
transition path and the ﬁnal equilibrium. We analyze both the long-run (steady state) eﬀects
and the transitional dynamics.
Our main results are as follows. First, there are beneﬁts from implementing unilateral struc-
tural reforms. A reduction of markup by 15 percentage points in the German (Portuguese)
labor and services market would induce an increase in the long-run German (Portuguese) output
equal to 8.8 (7.8) percent. As reforms are implemented gradually over a period of ﬁve years,
the output would smoothly reach its new long-run level in seven years. Second, cross-country
coordination of reforms in the euro area would add extra beneﬁts to each region , by limiting the
deterioration of relative prices and purchasing power that a country faces when implementing
reforms unilaterally. This is true in particular for a small and open economy such as Portugal.
Speciﬁcally, in the long run German output would increase by 9.2 percent, Portuguese output
by 8.6 percent. Third, cross-country coordination would make the macroeconomic performance
of the diﬀerent regions belonging to the euro area more homogeneous, both in terms of prices
and real activity. Overall, results suggest that reforms implemented apart by each country in the
euro area produce positive eﬀects, cross-country coordination produces larger and more evenly
distributed (positive) eﬀects.6
Our paper is related to several contributions analyzing the macroeconomic implications of
structural reforms. Bayoumi et al. (2004) analyze the eﬀects of greater competition in the euro
area. However, they do not focus neither on country-speciﬁc reforms nor distinguish between
manufacturing and services sectors. Jonsson (2006, 2007) analyzes the macroeconomic implica-
tions of imperfect competition in the product and labor market using a closed economy dynamic
general equilibrium model parameterized to ﬁt the euro area and the US, respectively.7 Benigno
and Thoenissen (2003) assess the implications of market reforms for the case of the UK calibrat-
ing a two-country DSGE model. Everaert and Schule (2008) compute a similar analysis focusing
on the eﬀects of synchronized structural reforms in the euro area. Diﬀerently from them, we can
fully assess international spillovers and the impact of coordination because we calibrate EAGLE
to the euro area and world economy. Forni et al. (2010a) analyze the role of greater competition
in the Italian services sector in a two country model of the euro area. They do not consider
spillovers related to trade with third-countries.
The paper has the following structure. The next section brieﬂy presents the theoretical
background of the model. Section 3 contains an overview of the calibration. Section 4 reports
results. Section 5 concludes.
6Our results are robust to calibrating the model, alternatively, to France and Italy as they are similar to
Germany in terms of the economic dimensions that the model is able to catch. To save on space we report only
results for the case of Germany and Portugal.
7Several recent contributions have also focused on the macroeconomic eﬀects of ﬁscal (tax- and public spending-
based) reforms in the euro area (see, among the others, Coenen et al., 2008b, and Forni et al., 2010b) and of
reforms aimed at reducing worldwide protectionism (see Faruqee et al., 2008).
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2.1 General features
We simulate the Euro Area and Global Economy (EAGLE) model, a multi-country dynamic
general equilibrium model of the euro area. In EAGLE the world economy is composed of four
blocs. Two out of four are members of the euro area, which is formalized as a monetary union.
The two countries have a common nominal exchange rate and a common nominal interest rate.
Each of the remaining two countries has its own nominal interest rate and nominal exchange rate.
Similarly to the European Central Bank New Area Wide model (NAWM) and the International
Monetary Fund Global Economy Model (GEM), EAGLE is microfounded and features nominal
price and wage rigidities, capital accumulation, international trade in goods and bonds. Explicit
microfoundations allow to clearly identify structural parameters and to properly analyze the
impact of structural changes. The general equilibrium framework allows to appropriately take
into account the eﬀects of households’ and ﬁrms’ behavior.
In each country there are three types of agents: households, ﬁrms and a public sector. Each
household is inﬁnitely lived. Households consume a ﬁnal good and decide how to allocate their
time between work and leisure. They supply diﬀerentiated labor to domestic ﬁrms in a monop-
olistic manner, thus exerting limited bargaining power and charging markups over the marginal
rate of substitution between labor and consumption. So they supply a lower amount of labor
than under perfect competition. Households own the portfolio of domestic ﬁrms and the domes-
tic capital stock, which they rent to domestic ﬁrms. The market for capital is competitive, and
capital accumulation is subject to standard investment adjustment costs. Labor and physical
capital are immobile internationally. Households also buy and sell two bonds: a domestic bond
denominated in domestic currency and an international bond issued in zero net supply world-
wide. When households undertake positions on the international bond they pay a premium to
ﬁnancial intermediaries, whose size is a function of the aggregate net asset position of the coun-
try. Households residing in the monetary union trade also a bond denominated in the common
currency.
On the production side, ﬁrms produce the nontradable ﬁnal goods, an array of diﬀerentiated
intermediate goods, and provide intermediation services. There are two nontradable ﬁnal goods
— a consumption good and an investment good — produced by perfectly competitive ﬁrms using
all available intermediate goods, combined accordingly to a constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) technology.
There are many varieties of intermediate goods, each produced by a single ﬁrm under con-
ditions of monopolistic competition. The market power implies that ﬁrms set nominal prices
charging a markup over marginal costs and produce an amount of goods which is lower than in
the case of perfect competition. Each intermediate good is produced using domestic labor inputs
and domestic capital. They are combined according to a Cobb-Douglas technology. Intermediate
goods are either nontraded or traded internationally. There is international price discrimination
8as ﬁrms set prices in the currency of the importing country (as such, goods markets are seg-
mented).
The government purchases nontraded intermediate goods and ﬁnances its expenditures with
public debt and various taxes on the domestic private sector. A standard ﬁscal rule ensures model
stability by appropriately adjusting lump-sum taxes, while tax rates and public purchases (as a
ratio to output) are kept constant across the simulations. As such, ﬁscal policy does not aﬀect
our main results (while the presence of ﬁscal items allows us to properly calibrate the steady
state of the model). As for the monetary authority, the central bank sets the national short-
term nominal interest rate according to a standard Taylor-type rule, by reacting to increases in
consumer price index (CPI from now on) inﬂation and real activity. The interest rate rule is
speciﬁed as follows for each region:
￿
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where R is the (quarterly) nominal interest rate, ¯ R its steady state value, π4 is the year-on-year
CPI inﬂation rate, ¯ π4 is the central bank CPI inﬂation target (assumed to be constant), gdp is
the gross domestic product. To capture inertia in the conduct of monetary policy, we assume
that the current period policy rate reacts to its one period-lagged value. In the euro area, π is
deﬁned as the average of two region-speciﬁc CPI inﬂation rates and gdp as the sum of the regional
gross domestic products. Note that in the euro area region-speciﬁc inﬂation rates determine the
region-speciﬁc real interest rates, because the nominal interest rate is common and set by the
central bank of the monetary union.
The model uses standard functional forms, which allows ﬁrms and consumers to be aggregated
as if they were a representative entity. Adjustment costs for real variables and nominal rigidities
enable EAGLE to mimic the typical hump-shaped reaction of macroeconomic variables to shocks
observed in more empirically oriented models of the euro area such as the estimated version of
the NAWM (see Christofell et al., 2008 and Smets and Wouters, 2003). There are investment
and import adjustment costs and external habit formation in consumption. All (intermediate
goods) prices and wages are sticky (Calvo, 1983) and indexed to a weighted average of previous
period CPI inﬂation rate and current period central bank’s inﬂation target.
2.2 Markups in labor and product markets
The monopolistic competition framework in the intermediate goods and labor markets is a crucial
feature for the type of analysis we perform. As such we will describe it in more detail in what
follows. Let’s consider the labor market setup ﬁrst. Each household oﬀers a speciﬁc kind of labor
services that is an imperfect substitute for services oﬀered by other households and set its wage
to maximize utility. The elasticity of substitution between labor varieties determines the related







λ−1Lτ,θL > 1 (2)
where W/P is the real wage (expressed in units of domestic consumption), λ is the marginal
utility of consumption. The parameter τ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
The markup is θL/(θL − 1) and depends negatively on the elasticity of substitution between
labor varieties, θL. So, the higher the degree of substitutability, the lower the implied markup
and the higher employment in terms of hours, for a given wage. As such, the markup reﬂects
imperfect competition in the labor market.
In the intermediate goods market, imperfect competition is introduced in a similar way.
There is a large number of ﬁrms oﬀering a continuum of diﬀerent products that are imperfect
substitutes. Each product is made by one monopolistic ﬁrm, which sets prices to maximize
proﬁts. The elasticity of substitution between products of diﬀerent ﬁrms determines the market
power of each ﬁrm. In steady state, in each sector (tradables and services sectors) a ﬁrst order
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where PY /P is the relative price of the generic intermediate good Y and MC/P is the real
marginal cost of producing Y . The markup is θY /(θY − 1) and depends negatively on the elas-
ticity of substitution between diﬀerent products, θY . So, the higher the degree of substitutability,
the lower the implied markup and the higher the production level, for a given price. As such,
the markup reﬂects imperfect competition.
Summing up, in EAGLE markups are modeled by a single parameter in each national market
(labor, tradable intermediate good, nontradable intermediate good), consistently with other sim-
ilar models based on the monopolistic competition framework. By permanently modifying the
elasticity parameters we can simulate the impact of structural reforms and modify the degree of
competition in the considered market. The higher the elasticity of substitution between varieties,
the lower the markup and the closer the market is to perfect competition.
8We assume that the generic household i gains utility from consumption (Ci,t) and disutility from working
(Li,t). In particular, we assume external habit formation, which means that its utility depends positively on the
diﬀerence between the current level of individual consumption, Ci,t, and the lagged average aggregate consumption



















where β is the discount factor, σ denotes the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and τ is the
inverse of the elasticity of work eﬀort with respect to the real wage. The parameter κ measures the degree of
external habit formation in consumption.
103 Calibration
We summarize in Tables 1 to 6 the (quarterly) calibration of the model. We illustrate the
markup values for labor, manufacturing and services, the values of parameters aﬀecting the
relevant steady state great ratios and the dynamics. They are set according to the empirical
evidence or existing literature on the NAWM and the GEM.
We calibrate the model to Germany (DE), the rest of the euro area (REA), the United States
(US) and the rest of the world (RW). We choose Germany because it is the largest economy of
the euro area. Alternatively, we calibrate the two euro area regions to Portugal (PT) and the
rest of the euro area. The calibration of the model to the Portuguese economy captures crucial
diﬀerences with respect to Germany, such as size, trade shares and weight of nontradables. We
report in Table 1 the implied great ratios for Germany and Portugal.9 In the other tables we
report only the German case to save on space.10
3.1 Markup values
We report in Table 2 initial markup values. We identify the nontradable and tradable interme-
diate sectors in the model with the services and manufacturing sectors in the data, respectively.
Markups in the euro area services and labor markets are higher than the corresponding values in
the US and the rest of the world. In each region the markup in the nontradable sector is higher
than that in the labor market. For the euro area, the latter is higher than the markup in the
manufacturing sector. In other terms, in the euro area the degree of competition is particularly
low in the services sector. Speciﬁcally, the (net) price markup in Germany and the rest of the euro
area is set to 50, 30, 20 percent in the services, labor and manufacturing sectors, respectively. In
the US and in the rest of the world the corresponding markups are set to 28, 16, 20 percent. Our
values are in line with other existing similar studies, such as Bayoumi et al. (2004), Faruqee et al.
(2007), Everaert and Schule (2008). Many, if not all, of these studies refer to Jean and Nicoletti
(2002), Oliveira Martins et al. (1996) and Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta (1999) for estimates
of markups on the basis of data from Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development.
Some additional empirical evidence for the euro area is provided by Christopoulou and Vermeulen
(2008). Their estimates suggest that the markup in the German services sector is similar to the
corresponding value for the euro area and that the markup in German manufacturing sector is
relatively low with respect to that in the German services sector.
9National accounts data are from the European Commission AMECO database and from the Statistics Por-
tugal.
10Tables for Portugal are available from the authors upon request. We assume that elasticities of substitution
and parameters regulating the dynamics are the same as in Germany, consistently with common practice in
calibrating multi-country models and so as to make results more easily comparable. We also set the same values
for markups given the lack of estimates for Portugal in the literature.
113.2 Other parameters
We report in Table 3 preference and technology parameters. Preferences are the same across
households of diﬀerent regions. We set the discount factor so that the steady-state annualized
real interest rate is about 3 percent, the habit persistence parameter to 0.70, the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution to 1.5 and the Frisch elasticity to 0.50. We set the quarterly depreciation
rate of capital to 0.025, consistently with an annual depreciation rate of 10 percent.
For the production side, there is a bias toward capital of 0.3 in the Cobb-Douglas production
functions of both tradable and nontradable intermediate goods. As for the ﬁnal goods baskets,
the degree of substitutability between domestic and imported tradables is higher than that
between tradables and nontradables, consistent with existing literature. In particular, we set the
(long-run) elasticity of substitution between tradables and nontradables to 0.5 while the elasticity
between domestic and imported tradables to 2.5.11 The biases toward the tradable bundle in
the consumption and investment baskets are equal respectively to 0.45 and 0.75 in each region
of the euro area, respectively to 0.35 and 0.75 in the US and the rest of the world. The weight of
domestic tradable goods in the consumption and investment tradable baskets is diﬀerent across
countries, to be coherent with multilateral import-to-GDP ratios.
In Table 4 we report nominal and real rigidities. We set Calvo price parameters in the
domestic tradables and nontradables sector to 0.92 (on average, ﬁrms adjust prices optimally
every 12.5 quarters) in the euro area, consistently with estimates by Christoﬀel et al. (2008) and
Smets and Wouters (2003).12 Corresponding nominal rigidities outside the euro area are equal
to 0.75, implying an average frequency of adjustment equal to 4 quarters, in line with Faruqee et
al. (2007). Calvo wage parameters and price parameters in the export sector are equal to 0.75
in all the regions. The indexation parameters on prices and wages are equal respectively to 0.50
and 0.75, so to get suﬃciently hump-shaped response of wages and prices. For real rigidities,
we set the parameters of the adjustment costs on investment changes to 6 in the euro area and
to 4 in the case of the US and the rest of the world; and adjustment costs on consumption
and investment imports to 2 and 1, respectively. We set weights of bilateral imports to match
the trade matrix reported in Table 5 (for details see Gomes et al., 2010).13 In particular, it’s
interesting to note that intra-euro area trade represents a signiﬁcant share of total trade in the
two euro area regions. We calibrate the net foreign asset position of each economy (as a ratio
to GDP) to match the corresponding data. Given the calibrated import shares, net foreign
asset position and international interest rate, the steady-state trade-balance ratio (to GDP) is
exogenously pinned-down, while export and import quantities as well as international relative
prices consistently adjust.14
11Note that the short-run elasticity for imported goods is lower than its long-run value because of adjustment
costs on imports. Numbers are consistent with Bayoumi et al. (2004).
12In fact, given that we assume indexation, prices (and wages) change every period.
13The trade matrix covers intra and extra euro area ﬂows of goods and services. Numbers are computed by the
authors using AMECO and Eurostat data.
14The indeterminacy of steady state net foreign asset position and trade balance is standard in open economy
models with representative households and incomplete international ﬁnancial markets. See, for example, Pesenti
12Finally, in Table 6 we report parameters in the monetary policy rules, where the (annualized)
interest rate reacts to the its lagged value (inertial component of the monetary policy), annual
inﬂation and quarterly output growth (see equation 1).
4 Results
In this section we report the results of our simulations. We analyze the macroeconomic eﬀects
of structural reforms in the euro area labor and services markets. We assume that reforms are
implemented in a gradual way over a period of ﬁve years (consistently, markups are reduced
gradually to a permanently lower value). We also assume that households and ﬁrms have perfect
foresight, thus eliminating any uncertainty about the credibility of the reforms.15 We report
both long-run (steady-state) values of the variables and the related transition dynamics. To
stress the role of cross-region coordination, we compare results when reforms are implemented in
Germany in isolation and simultaneously in both regions of the euro area. To make our results
more general, we also report the case of reforms implemented in Portugal. Finally, we perform
sensitivity analysis by appropriately changing the values of some key parameters.
4.1 Unilateral reforms in Germany
In this section we initially report results of the reform in the German services sector. Subse-
quently, we show results when the reform is implemented in the German labor market. Finally,
we consider the case of simultaneous reforms in German services and labor markets.
4.1.1 Services sector
In Table 7 we report the long-run results of reducing the (gross) markup in the German services
sector by 5, 10, 15 percentage points. Overall, the macroeconomic impact of the reforms is sizable.
In the case of a 15 percentage points markup reduction (the gross markup is permanently reduced
to 1.35), German output rises by 4.4 percent.16 The increase is driven by higher investment (7.1
percent) and consumption (1.8 percent). Firms increase demand for capital and labor. In
particular, hours worked and real wage increase by 3.1 and 7.5 percent, respectively.
As for international trade, the excess supply of German services induces a depreciation of the
(multilateral) real exchange rate and a deterioration of the (multilateral) terms of trade, as the
relative price of nontradables becomes lower.17 In the case of a 15 percentage points markup
(2008). To the opposite, along the transition dynamics the trade balance and the net foreign asset position
endogenously adjust to the given shock. For this reason, we include the dynamics of the trade balance in the
charts reporting the transitional equilibrium.
15As in other large scale dynamic general equilibrium models, abstracting from aggregate uncertainty simpliﬁes
computation. See for example Ferrero (2010).
16Gross domestic product and its components are evaluated in real terms, i.e. using the initial (pre-reform)
ﬁxed steady state prices (see Faruqee et al., 2007).
17The real exchange rate of a region is deﬁned as the ratio of the foreign to the domestic CPI indices, both
expressed in the domestic currency. An increase represents a depreciation. The terms of trade of a region is the
13reduction, German exports increase by 1.1 percent favored by the depreciation. German imports
increase as well, by 0.6 percent, driven by higher German aggregate demand.18
Spillovers to the rest of the euro area are positive but small. Output, consumption and invest-
ment in the rest of the euro area increase in a negligible way. This is not surprising, given that
services are nontradables and that the size of Germany in the world economy is relatively small.
Both rest of the euro area exports and imports respectively to and from Germany (not reported)
increase. Exports increase because of higher German aggregate demand. Imports increase to a
bigger extent, because German tradables are now cheaper. For the same reason, rest of euro area
exports to the US and to the rest of the world (not reported) decline, as world demand shifts
toward cheaper German tradables. Given the German real exchange rate depreciation and the
deterioration in the German terms of trade, the purchasing power of households resident outside
Germany improves, in particular those residing in the rest of the euro area because of higher
trade linkages. Welfare eﬀects on German and rest of the euro area households (measured in
terms of consumption equivalents) are positive and, in the case of German households, sizeable.19
Finally, spillovers to the rest of the world and the US output are negligible.
In Figures 1-4 we show the domestic and cross-country eﬀects of reforms in the German
services sector along the transition from the initial to the new steady-state (we report results
obtained in the case of a 10 percentage point reduction in the markup). In Figure 1 we report
the domestic eﬀects. German households anticipate that services will be cheaper in the future,
when their supply will be higher. As such, given its high services content, households postpone
consumption to future periods, when it will be cheaper. Consumption drops in the ﬁrst two years
and then starts to increase but stays below the initial steady state level for around 5 years, roughly
the amount of time needed to fully implement reforms. Simultaneously, ﬁrms gradually increase
demand for physical capital, so to have a higher stock of capital when the production level has
to be increased (in correspondence of higher competition). The increase in investment drives up
demand for domestic tradables. Similarly, the real wage follows an increasing path, given that
ﬁrms gradually increase labor demand, as the price markup becomes lower. After roughly one
year from the beginning of the reform, German output starts to monotonically increase toward its
new long-run level, driven to a great extent by higher production of nontradables. The German-
speciﬁc real interest rate increases over time, as the nominal interest rate, set taking into account
of euro area-wide variables, hardly moves while German inﬂation decreases. The higher German
real interest rate further stimulates German households to postpone consumption.
ratio of import to export prices, both expressed in domestic currency. An increase corresponds to a deterioration.
For the details on the construction of the multilateral index, see Gomes et al. (2010).
18German bilateral export and imports (not reported in the table) increase respectively toward and from all
other regions.
19Denoting L0 as the initial steady state level of labor eﬀort, and CFIN and LFIN as the ﬁnal steady-state
levels of consumption and labor, i.e. after the markup change, the consumption equivalent CE is deﬁned implicitly
by:
W (CE,L0) = W (CFIN,LFIN).
The CE is a measure of the permanent change in consumption required to achieve the new level of utility holding
labor eﬀort constant at its original (steady-state) value. Following Bayoumi et al. (2004), this welfare measure is
independent of habit persistence parameter.
14The trade balance initially rises, as German demand decreases. In the medium run it stays
persistently below its equilibrium level, as aggregate demand increases. The German real ex-
change rate depreciates over time, so as to absorb the increasing excess supply. The terms of
trade deteriorate only slightly, as the real exchange rate depreciation is partially compensated
by the increase in the relative price of German tradables.20
In Figure 2 we report the short-to-medium run spillovers to the rest of the euro area. Spillovers
are positive. Regarding real activity, they are larger in the short run than in the medium run.
Cheaper imports from Germany and higher exports to the rest of the world and the US (see
below) have a positive eﬀect on rest of the euro area production and income. The related
increase in regional inﬂation drives down the real interest rate in the rest of the euro area, given
also the smoothed reaction of the nominal interest rate. This further stimulates consumption
and hence aggregate demand for tradables and nontradables.
Higher aggregate demand stimulates imports, in particular from Germany. Overall, the rest
of the euro area trade balance initially falls, as domestic aggregate demand increases and the
world demand shifts toward cheaper German goods. In the medium run it improves, as German
aggregate demand gradually increases. The rest of the euro area terms of trade slightly improve
and the real exchange rate appreciates in the medium run, consistently with the relatively scarcity
of rest of the euro area goods (or, equivalently, the excess supply of German goods).
German exports increase toward all countries, while German imports from all countries de-
crease in the short run, driven by lower German aggregate demand in the initial periods (Figure
3). On impact the German bilateral real exchange rates against US and rest of the world curren-
cies depreciate to a bigger extent than the real exchange rate against the rest of the euro area,
as the euro area nominal exchange rate depreciates (the depreciation of the German vis-` a-vis
rest of the euro area bilateral real exchange rate is smooth, as it reﬂects the inﬂation diﬀerential
only). Consistently with the local currency pricing assumption, German terms of trade slightly
improve in the short-run (ﬁrms set nominal prices in the currency of the destination market and,
as such, there is incomplete short-run pass-through of nominal exchange rate into import prices).
We report in Figure 4 the trade variables for the rest of the euro area. Rest of the euro
area exports toward the US and the rest of the world decrease in the medium run, as German
tradables become more competitive. International relative prices against the rest of the world
and the US deteriorate on impact, reﬂecting the fact that higher aggregate demand in the euro
area as a whole stimulates production relatively more in the rest of the euro area than in the
US and the rest of the world. As such, the improvement in rest of the euro area international
relative prices is driven by the bilateral relative prices against Germany.
Summing up, German-speciﬁc services reforms produce positive eﬀects domestically, even
if the German international relative prices deteriorate, partially limiting the increase in the
purchasing power of German households. Spillover eﬀects to the rest of the euro area are positive
as well, along the transition and in the long run. Howeverthey are relatively small when compared
20Reform in the services sector induces an increase in real wages and hence in the production costs of both
tradables and nontradables.
15with German domestic eﬀects implying that the macroeconomic performance across the two
regions is rather diﬀerent.
4.1.2 Labor market
We show in Table 8 the long-run eﬀects of reducing markups in the German labor market.
There are several diﬀerences in terms of the eﬀects of the reform on the main economic variables
compared to the services sector reform.
For the domestic eﬀects, the following results arise. First, hours worked increase while real
wages decrease. In contrast, in the case of services reform of similar size real wages increase
because of the higher competition in the services market (it pushes up labor demand and drives
down consumption prices). Second, employment increases relatively more since ﬁrms have a
stronger incentive to use labor input as real wages decrease. Third, exports increase more as
well, because the lower real wage translates into a lower marginal cost in the whole economy
and hence in lower prices of both tradables and nontradables. Consistently, the German terms
of trade deteriorate to a greater extent. To the opposite, the German real exchange depreciates
less because the relative price of services, which is a large share of the consumption bundle,
decreases to a lower extent. Finally, imports increase more as well. This is so due to the lower
real exchange rate depreciation and the stronger increase in consumption, that represents a large
share of aggregate demand though having a lower import content than investment.
Spillovers to the rest of the euro area are positive and bigger than in the case of reforms in
the services sector, as the rest of the euro area now beneﬁts from more favorable terms of trade
movements. The eﬀect stimulates consumption and investment in the rest of the euro area. Real
output increases, while rest of euro area exports to the US and to the rest of the world (not
reported) decline (German tradables are cheaper). Also in this case welfare eﬀects in Germany
and the rest of the euro area are positive.
Spillovers to the rest of the world are also bigger than in the case of reforms in the services
sector. As for the rest of the euro area, the stimulating eﬀect is due to the combination of higher
exports of the rest of the world toward Germany and the improvement in the rest of the world
terms of trade. Spillovers to the US are negligible, as in the case of the services sector reform
(as previously said, the US mainly trades with the rest of the world).
In Figures 5-8 we show the domestic and cross-country eﬀects of reforms in the German labor
market along the transition path (10 percentage point reduction in the markup). In Figure 5 we
show the domestic eﬀects. German ﬁrms foresee that labor will be cheaper in the future and that
labor supply will increase. They immediately start to adjust the stock of capital, that will make
labor more productive, inducing an immediate increase in investment. To produce more capital
goods, ﬁrms increase labor demand as well. Given that labor supply is relatively low, real wages
initially increase, and then decrease over time. Higher demand for investment goods drives up
production and inﬂation. Consumption smoothly and monotonically increases (toward the new
steady state level), beneﬁting from higher labor income given higher hours worked. The same
16is true for output. In addition, the real interest rate in Germany initially falls. Subsequently, it
increases as German inﬂation increases to a lower extent and eventually declines. The German
real exchange rate depreciates and the terms of trade deteriorate over time, as the increase in
German supply of labor gradually translates into excess supply in the goods market. The trade
balance initially drops below its steady state level and then moves slightly above, as the excess
supply kicks in and makes German tradables more competitive.
In Figure 6 we report spillovers to the rest of the euro area. They are positive and, on real
activity, larger in the short run than in the long run. Higher German imports favor economic
activity in the rest of the euro area. The initial increase in rest of the euro area inﬂation
rate is only partially counterbalanced by the higher nominal interest rate, as the latter reacts
in a smooth way. As such rest of the euro area-speciﬁc real interest rate falls, stimulating
consumption, investment and, hence, total output. Hours worked increase mainly on impact.
The rest of the euro area real exchange rate depreciates on impact, while in the long run it
appreciates, consistently with the gradual increase in German (and euro area) supply of goods.
For the same reason rest of the euro area terms of trade show a lasting improvement. The trade
balance is overall balanced. As shown in Figures 7 and 8, higher imports from Germany are
counterbalanced by (a) the improvement in international relative prices and (b) the increase in
exports of the rest of the euro area toward Germany, that counterbalances the shift in world
demand towards German tradables.
Overall, as in the case of services reform, the increase in competition in the German labor
market produces positive domestic eﬀects.21 Spillover eﬀects to the rest of the euro area are
positive as well, along the transition and in the long run. Moreover, they are somehow larger
than in the case of services reforms, as the rest of the euro area beneﬁts from cheaper German
tradable goods and the consumption-driven increase in German aggregate demand. Also in this
case German households face a deterioration in international relative prices and the economic
performance across euro area regions in uneven.
4.1.3 Services sector and labor market
In the previous exercises we focused on reforms being carried out separately. The next step is
to quantify how beneﬁcial it would be to implement reforms simultaneously in both markets. In
Table 9 we show results of simultaneously lowering markups in both German labor and services
markets, starting from the corresponding initial values. The eﬀects of individual reforms are
more or less additive. In particular, real wages increase, given that the increase in labor demand
more than counterbalances the increase in labor supply. The former is associated with the reform
in services sector. The latter with the reform in the labor market.22 This result relates to a
general point about the “optimal timing” of reforms made by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003),
who argue that structural reforms should generally start from the service sector because the
21The results for Portugal are similar as shown below and are also in line with the ﬁndings of Forni et al.
(2010a) for Italy.
22Results for the real wage are conditional on the relative size of the reforms.
17ensuing increase in real wages helps to generate support for subsequent reforms in the labor
market (which instead are going to decrease the real wages). Both exports and imports increase,
favored by the real exchange rate depreciation. Spillovers to the rest of the euro area are positive.
They are qualitatively similar to those obtained when labor and services reforms are implemented
in an isolated manner. Welfare improves in both Germany and the rest of the euro area.
In Figures 9-12 we show the domestic and cross-country eﬀects of reforms in the German
services sector and labor market along the transition path. We consider the case of a 10 per-
centage point reduction in the corresponding markup values. In Figure 9 we show the eﬀects in
the German economy. Results are similar to those obtained when implementing services market
reform in a stand alone fashion. In particular the real wage monotonically increases over time,
even though reforms in the labor market are implemented. Spillovers to the rest of the euro area
are positive and slightly larger than those obtained when reforms are implemented solely in one
sector (Figure 10). For trade variables, German exports increase toward all regions (Figure 11).
To the opposite, exports of the rest of the euro area decrease in the medium run, given that
German tradable sector gradually becomes more competitive (Figure 12).
4.2 Simultaneous reforms across euro area regions
In the previous section we have shown that the German economy beneﬁts from domestic struc-
tural reforms, even if international relative prices deteriorate. Moreover, spillovers to the rest of
the euro area are relatively small. Higher German aggregate demand and cheaper German trad-
able goods favor the increase in rest of the euro economic activity, consumption and investment,
but only to a small extent. As such, when reforms are implemented in one country only, the
macroeconomic performance across euro area regions is rather diﬀerent in both the short and
the long run.
In this section we assess the impact of implementing reforms simultaneously in Germany and
the rest of the euro area. We assume that both regions reduce markups by the same amount in
the labor and services markets, that the reduction is gradual (over a period of ﬁve years) and
fully anticipated.
In Table 10 we show the long-run results of the simultaneous reforms in the two euro area
regions. German multilateral international relative prices deteriorate to a lower extent than in the
case of German unilateral reforms because Germany beneﬁts from cheaper imports as aggregate
supply in the rest of the euro area increases. Moreover, the increase in economy activity is more
evenly spread across the two regions. In each region, output rises by more than 9 percent in the
case of a simultaneous reduction of markups by 15 percentage points. Regional welfare increases
in both euro area regions, consistently with the lower degree of monopolistic distortions.
Spillovers to the rest of the world are now stronger namely given the higher weight in the
world economy of the regions carrying out the reforms. The rest of the world beneﬁts from the
improvement in international relative prices. Consistently, imports from Germany and the rest
of the euro area increase. Spillovers to the US are positive as well, albeit relatively small, as the
18trade linkages with the euro area are more limited than in the case of the rest of the world.
In Figures 13-16 we show the eﬀects of reforms in the euro area services sector and labor
market along the transition path. We consider the case of a 10 percentage point reduction in the
corresponding markup values. In Figures 13 and 14 we show the transition path for Germany
and the rest of the euro area, respectively. Diﬀerently from the case of unilateral implementation
of reforms, the two euro area regions have rather similar macroeconomic performances in the
short and medium run. There is an initial reduction in consumption in both regions. Resources
are initially exploited for increasing investment, so as to sustain the higher level of production in
the future. The decrease in consumption is limited by the initial decrease of the real interest rate,
given the relatively quick increase in the inﬂation rate and the smoothed response of the nominal
interest rate. For the trade balance (as a percentage of GDP), in each region it initially shows
a surplus as both regions postpone consumption. Subsequently, as reforms gradually kick in
and the euro area aggregate demand increases, the trade balance in each region moves below its
equilibrium level. In each region the real exchange rate depreciates. In the case of Germany, its
relative prices deteriorate to a lower extent than in the case of unilaterally implemented reforms.
In Figures 15 and 16 we show bilateral trade variables for Germany and the rest of the euro
area, respectively. They react in a rather symmetric way. Diﬀerently from the case of German
unilateral reforms, rest of the euro area exports now increase. The increase in aggregate supply is
now symmetric among the two euro area regions, implying that the international competitiveness
of both regions (not only of Germany) increases. A larger depreciation of German and rest of
the euro area bilateral real exchange rates against the US and the rest of the world is associated
with the euro area-wide reforms.23
Overall, cross-country simultaneous reforms have rather large and positive eﬀects on the euro
area macroeconomic performance, in the short and long run. Compared to the case of unilateral
reforms they imply a similar macroeconomic performance across the euro area regions and a
lower deterioration in international relative prices for each region.
4.3 Reforms in a small economy: the case of Portugal
To assess if our results are robust to the size and openness of a country, we consider the case
of reforms implemented in Portugal, which is among the smallest euro area countries and is
relatively open to trade, namely with other euro area countries. Table 11 shows the long-run
eﬀects of lowering markup by 15 percentage points in Portuguese labor and services markets,
starting from the corresponding initial values. As for the case of Germany, reforms are gradually
implemented over a period of ﬁve years and perfectly anticipated by households.24 We report the
eﬀects of reforms in the services market, in the labor market, in both markets and coordinated
with the rest of the euro area.
23As previously said, the German multilateral real exchange rate depreciates to a lower extent than in the case
of unilateral reforms, given that aggregate supply increases in the rest of the euro area as well.
24To save on space, we do not report results for the transition dynamics. They are broadly similar to the case
of Germany and are available from the authors upon request.
19Reforms implemented unilaterally produce positive domestic eﬀects, as they reduce the dis-
tortions existing in the economy. Compared to the case of Germany, the eﬀect on output is
relatively low, as Portugal is more open than Germany (imports have a higher weight in the
domestic demand). Spillover eﬀects to rest of the euro area are smaller than in the case of
German reforms. The simulations also show that the movement in relative prices, as in the case
of Germany, is not beneﬁcial for the region implementing reforms as the Portuguese terms of
trade deteriorate and real exchange rate depreciates. In the case of Portugal the exchange rate
depreciation has a larger negative impact on households’ consumption, because the latter is more
biased toward imported goods. As such, consumption in Portugal increases to a lower extent
than in the case of Germany. This is true in particular when reforms are implemented in the
services sector, as the real exchange rate depreciates to a bigger extent than in the case of labor
market reforms. In the latter case, instead, there is a stronger incentive to substitute domestic
for imported tradables, as the price of the domestic tradables decreases in relative terms thanks
to the reduction in real wages (consistently, the Portuguese terms of trade deteriorate to a larger
extent than in the case of services reform).
As in the case of Germany, reforms simultaneously implemented with the rest of the euro area
produce large beneﬁts for Portugal and make the macroeconomic performance of the two regions
rather similar. Output would increase by 8.6 percent in Portugal. Moreover, compared to the
case of Germany, cross-country simultaneous reforms would imply that the Portuguese exports
increase relatively more than in the case of the country-speciﬁc reforms. For two reasons. First,
its considerable openness to intra-euro area trade. Second, Portuguese isolated reforms induce a
lower stimulating eﬀect on the rest of the euro area than that of German isolated reform. Hence,
Portugal beneﬁts from the larger (than in the case of Germany) increase in aggregate demand
in the rest of the euro area when reforms are coordinated across countries.
Overall, results suggest that reforms are beneﬁcial for a small economy such as Portugal.
They are particularly so if reforms are implemented simultaneously in the euro area, given the
degree of openness of the Portuguese economy.
4.4 Sensitivity analysis
Finally, in Table 12 we report the long-run eﬀects of both German and euro area-wide coordinated
reforms in the labor and services sectors for alternative values of key parameters (considering a
15 percentage points a reduction of markups). We show the eﬀects on Germany and the rest
of the euro area. In particular, the table reports the case of lower and higher intertemporal
elasticity of substitution (set respectively to 1 and 3 instead of 1.5 as in the baseline calibration),
lower and higher Frisch labor elasticity (set to 0.33 and 0.99 instead of 0.5) and lower and higher
elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported tradable goods (set to 1.5 and 5 instead
of 2).
The main message is that baseline results are quite robust to changes in the considered
parameters. Compared to the benchmark scenario (Tables 9 and 10), the economic expansion in
20the euro area continues to be sizeable and broadly similar across regions. The impact of reforms
on welfare remains positive and considerable. The value of the elasticities aﬀect the relative size
of responses of prices and quantities. In the case of low values, quantities are less responsive to
changes in relative prices and hence aggregate demand increase to a lower extent than in the
benchmark scenario. As such, the increase in output is lower as well. Similar considerations
hold for the case of relatively large values of the elasticities but in the opposite direction. The
impact of the alternative parameters on the overall results is not particularly strong except, to
some extent, in the case of the lower (respectively higher) Frisch elasticity that implies a smaller
(bigger) increase in employment and, correspondingly, in GDP.
5 Conclusions
We have quantitatively analyzed the macroeconomic implications of greater competition in euro
area labor markets and services sectors by simulating a multi-country microfounded general
equilibrium model of Germany (alternatively Portugal) and the rest of the euro area. The
monetary union dimension of the model allowed us to assess cross-regional spillovers and the
implications of coordination of reforms across countries. Because of the presence of two regions
not belonging to the euro area we have been able to clearly distinguish the impact of the reforms
on intra-euro area trade and extra-euro area trade variables. Our analysis stresses two points.
First, isolated increases in the levels of competition in one country produce large positive domestic
eﬀects, while spillovers to the other regions are positive but relatively small. This introduces
cross-country heterogeneity in the macroeconomic performance in both the short and the long
run. Second, cross-country coordination of reforms would produce larger positive eﬀects in
comparison to the case of isolated country-speciﬁc reforms. Each country would beneﬁt from
the economic activity expansion in the partner’s economy. Moreover, from the perspective of
the euro area as whole, the macroeconomic performance would be more uniform across regions.
Overall, our results suggest that competition-oriented reforms in the euro area produce beneﬁts,
in particular if they are coordinated across regions.
The analysis of macroeconomic eﬀects of structural reforms can be extended along several
lines. First, competition-friendly reforms and ﬁscal reforms in euro area regions can interact
in the context of a policy strategy aimed simultaneously at consolidating public ﬁnance and
increasing potential output in the euro area. For example reforms can limit the need to increase
taxes by stimulating activity in the euro area, further contributing to limit distortions in the
euro area economy. Second, we can assess the impact of reforms when households diﬀer in terms
of access to ﬁnancial markets (implying diﬀerences across households in terms of consumption
smoothing and international risk-sharing). From this point of view, coordination of reforms with
appropriate social spending measures (one of the main items of the European Union balance)
becomes crucial to limit an uneven distribution of costs and beneﬁts inside and across euro
21area (and more generally, European Union) regions.25 Third, and ﬁnally, we can analyze if and
to what extent regional ﬁscal policy can contribute to eﬃciently stabilize in the short run the
economy of a country of the euro area that unilaterally implements structural reforms. All these
points stress the relevance of the cross-regional dimension of the euro area for appropriately
designing structural and stabilization policies. We leave them for future research.
25For a model-based assessment of the Cohesion Policy expenditure in the European Union, see Varga and in’t
Veld (2010).
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25Table 1: Steady-State National Accounts (percentage of GDP)
DE REA US RW PT
Private consumption 60.9 59.6 63.2 64.5 53.4
Private investment 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 19.7
Public expenditure 20.0 20.0 16.0 16.0 21.0
Imports 27.6 23.8 11.5 14.9 32.9
Consumption goods 18.4 20.1 7.3 8.6 17.0
Investment goods 9.2 3.6 4.2 6.3 15.9
Public debt (% of yearly GDP) 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0
Share of services sector 60.6 61.7 63.1 62.5 52.5
Share of world GDP 6.9 16.2 30.5 46.4 0.20
DE=Germany; REA=Rest of euro area; US=United States; RW=Rest of the world; PT=Portugal.
Table 2: (Gross) Price and Wage Markups
DE REA US RW
Manufacturing (tradables) price markup 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20
Services (nontradables) price markup 1.50 1.50 1.28 1.28
Wage markup 1.30 1.30 1.16 1.16
DE=Germany; REA=Rest of euro area; US=United States; RW=Rest of the world.
26Table 3: Households and Firms Behavior
DE REA US RW
Households
Subjective discount factor 1.03−0.25 1.03−0.25 1.03−0.25 1.03−0.25
Depreciation rate 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Habit persistence 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
Inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Tradable Intermediate Goods
Bias toward capital 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
Nontradable Intermediate Goods
Bias toward capital 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
Final consumption goods
Substitution btw domestic and imp. goods 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50
Bias toward domestic goods 0.31 0.21 0.65 0.58
Substitution btw tradables and nontrad. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Bias toward tradable goods 0.45 0.45 0.35 0.35
Final investment goods
Substitution btw domestic and imp. goods 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50
Bias toward domestic goods 0.42 0.80 0.70 0.55
Substitution btw tradables and nontr. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Bias toward tradable goods 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
DE=Germany; REA=Rest of euro area; US=United States; RW=Rest of the world.
27Table 4: Real and Nominal Rigidities.
DE REA US RW
Real Rigidities
Investment adjustment 6.00 6.00 4.00 4.00
Import adjustment (consumption) 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Import adjustment (investment) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Nominal Rigidities
Households
Wage stickiness 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Wage indexation 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Manufacturing
Price stickiness (domestically produced goods) 0.92 0.92 0.75 0.75
Price indexation (domestically produced goods) 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Price stickiness (imported goods) 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Price indexation (imported goods) 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Services
Price stickiness 0.92 0.92 0.75 0.75
Indexation 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
DE=Germany; REA=Rest of euro area; US=United States; RW=Rest of the world.
28Table 5: International Linkages (percentage of GDP)
DE REA US RW
Substitution between consumption imports 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50
Imported consumption goods from
DE ... 3.1 0.3 1.1
REA 8.7 ... 0.8 3.5
US 1.2 0.5 ... 4.0
RW 8.5 16.6 6.2 ...
Substitution between investment imports 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50
Imported investment goods from
DE ... 2.2 0.2 0.7
REA 4.4 ... 0.4 2.2
US 0.6 0.7 ... 3.4
RW 4.3 0.8 3.6 ...
Trade balance (%yearly GDP) −0.23 0.09 0.19 −0.12
Net foreign assets (%yearly GDP) 10 −3.75 −15 10
Financial intermediation cost function 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
DE=Germany; REA=Rest of euro area; US=United States; RW=Rest of the world.
Table 6: Monetary Policy
EA US RW
Inﬂation target 1.02 1.02 1.02
Interest rate inertia 0.87 0.87 0.87
Interest rate sensitivity to inﬂation gap 1.70 1.70 1.70
Interest rate sensitivity to output growth 0.10 0.10 0.10
EA=euro area; US=United States; RW=Rest of the world.
29Table 7 - Long-Run Eﬀects of Reducing Services Markups in Germany
(percent deviations from baseline)
Markup Level 1.45 1.40 1.35
Domestic Eﬀects
Real GDP 1.28 2.87 4.39
Consumption 0.54 1.18 1.76
Investment 2.04 4.62 7.14
Hours worked 0.88 1.99 3.07
Real wage 2.14 4.84 7.47
Exports 0.32 0.72 1.08
Imports 0.17 0.37 0.56
Real exchange rate 1.92 4.35 6.70
Terms of trade 0.14 0.30 0.45
Welfare (CE) 0.17 0.32 0.42
Spillovers to the REA
Real GDP 0.01 0.02 0.03
Consumption 0.02 0.04 0.06
Investment 0.02 0.05 0.08
Hours worked 0.00 0.00 0.01
Real wage 0.02 0.03 0.05
Exports 0.02 0.05 0.08
Imports 0.06 0.13 0.19
Real exchange rate −0.41 −0.90 −1.38
Terms of trade −0.03 −0.06 −0.09
Welfare (CE) 0.02 0.04 0.06
Spillovers to the RW
Real GDP 0.00 0.00 0.00
Spillovers to the US
Real GDP 0.00 0.01 0.01
REA=Rest of euro area; US=United States; RW=Rest of the world.
30Table 8: Long-Run Eﬀects of Reducing Labor Markups in Germany
(percent deviations from baseline)
Markup Level 1.25 1.20 1.15
Domestic Eﬀects
Real GDP 1.35 2.77 4.27
Consumption 1.18 2.43 3.74
Investment 1.12 2.30 3.55
Hours worked 1.46 3.00 4.63
Real wage −0.26 −0.52 −0.79
Exports 1.22 2.50 3.85
Imports 0.69 1.42 2.18
Real exchange rate 0.34 0.69 1.06
Terms of trade 0.51 1.04 1.60
Welfare (CE) 0.56 1.11 1.66
Spillovers to the REA
Real GDP 0.03 0.07 0.11
Consumption 0.07 0.14 0.21
Investment 0.09 0.19 0.29
Hours worked 0.01 0.01 0.02
Real wage 0.06 0.12 0.18
Exports 0.09 0.19 0.29
Imports 0.22 0.46 0.71
Real exchange rate −0.03 −0.07 −0.11
Terms of trade −0.10 −0.20 −0.31
Welfare (CE) 0.06 0.13 0.20
Spillovers to the RW
Real GDP 0.01 0.02 0.03
Spillovers to the US
Real GDP 0.00 0.00 0.01
REA=Rest of euro area; US=United States; RW=Rest of the world.
31Table 9: Long-Run Eﬀects of Reducing Labor and Services Markups in Germany
(percent deviations from baseline)
Markup reduction (pp) 5 10 15
Domestic Eﬀects
Real GDP 2.64 5.71 8.83
Consumption 1.73 3.64 5.56
Investment 3.19 7.03 10.92
Hours worked 2.36 5.05 7.83
Real wage 1.88 4.29 6.60
Exports 1.55 3.23 4.97
Imports 0.86 1.79 2.74
Real exchange rate 2.27 5.06 7.81
Terms of trade 0.65 1.34 2.06
Welfare (CE) 0.71 1.36 1.91
Spillovers to the REA
Real GDP 0.04 0.09 0.14
Consumption 0.09 0.18 0.27
Investment 0.12 0.24 0.37
Hours worked 0.01 0.02 0.03
Real wage 0.07 0.15 0.24
Exports 0.11 0.24 0.37
Imports 0.28 0.59 0.91
Real exchange rate −0.44 −0.98 −1.51
Terms of trade −0.13 −0.26 −0.41
Welfare (CE) 0.08 0.17 0.26
Spillovers to the RW
Real GDP 0.01 0.02 0.04
Spillovers to the US
Real GDP 0.00 0.00 0.01
REA=Rest of euro area; US=United States; RW=Rest of the world.
32Table 10: Long-Run Eﬀects of Reducing Labor and Services Markups
in Germany and the Rest of the Euro Area (percent deviations)
Markup reduction (pp) 5 10 15
German Eﬀects
Real GDP 2.87 5.93 9.19
Consumption 2.00 4.10 6.28
Investment 3.66 7.62 11.87
Hours worked 2.46 5.10 7.91
Real wage 2.27 4.70 7.25
Exports 1.79 3.67 5.65
Imports 1.47 3.01 4.63
Real exchange rate 1.41 2.89 4.43
Terms of trade 0.33 0.67 1.02
Welfare (CE) 0.93 1.79 2.57
REA Eﬀects
Real GDP 2.88 5.95 9.22
Consumption 1.98 4.04 6.20
Investment 3.73 7.76 12.09
Hours worked 2.45 5.06 7.85
Real wage 2.22 4.59 7.07
Exports 1.41 2.87 4.40
Imports 1.00 2.04 3.13
Real exchange rate 1.85 3.81 5.84
Terms of trade 0.46 0.92 1.40
Welfare (CE) 0.88 1.70 2.43
Spillovers to the RW
Real GDP 0.05 0.09 0.14
Spillovers to the US
Real GDP 0.01 0.01 0.02
REA=Rest of euro area; US=United States; RW=Rest of the world.
33Table 11: Long-Run Eﬀects of Reducing Markups in Portugal by 15 pp
(percent deviations from baseline)
Market Services Labor Both markets EA wide
Portuguese Eﬀects
Real GDP 3.62 4.02 7.77 8.59
Consumption 1.47 3.52 5.04 6.39
Investment 4.81 2.79 7.71 9.97
Hours worked 2.55 4.59 7.26 7.40
Real wage 6.20 −0.99 5.12 6.32
Exports 0.86 3.84 4.73 5.71
Imports 1.01 2.25 3.28 6.06
Real exchange rate 5.87 1.03 6.95 1.80
Terms of trade 0.35 1.52 1.87 0.26
Welfare (CE) 0.09 0.96 0.87 2.10
REA Eﬀects
Real GDP 0.00 0.00 0.01 9.22
Consumption 0.00 0.01 0.01 6.23
Investment 0.00 0.01 0.02 12.01
Hours worked 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.82
Real wage 0.00 0.01 0.01 7.04
Exports 0.01 0.02 0.03 3.52
Imports 0.01 0.05 0.07 1.98
Real exchange rate −0.08 −0.02 −0.11 7.22
Terms of trade −0.01 −0.04 −0.05 1.47
Welfare (CE) 0.00 0.01 0.01 2.58
Spillovers to the RW
Real GDP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09
Spillovers to the US
Real GDP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
EA: euro area; REA=Rest of euro area; US=United States; RW=Rest of the world.
34Table 12: Sensitivity. Long-Run Eﬀects of Reducing Markups in the German Product and Labor Markets by 15 p.p.
(percent deviations from baseline)
German price and wage markups
Intertemp. elast. substitution Frisch labor elasticity Elast. subst. btw tradables
Benchmark Lower (1) Higher (3) Lower (0.33) Higher (0.99) Lower (1.5) Higher (5)
DE REA DE REA DE REA DE REA DE REA DE REA DE REA
Real GDP 8.83 0.14 8.21 0.10 9.59 0.00 6.81 0.08 13.26 0.26 8.72 0.16 9.00 0.10
Consumption 5.56 0.27 5.02 0.23 6.23 0.34 3.83 0.17 9.36 0.51 5.34 0.33 5.90 0.19
Investment 10.92 0.37 10.41 0.30 11.56 0.46 9.20 0.23 14.70 0.68 10.62 0.44 11.37 0.26
Hours worked 7.83 0.03 7.19 0.00 8.63 0.07 5.66 0.01 12.59 0.08 7.80 0.03 7.87 0.02
Real wage 6.60 0.24 6.70 0.22 6.48 0.26 6.98 0.15 5.81 0.42 6.40 0.28 6.90 0.16
Exports 4.97 0.37 4.44 0.31 5.62 0.44 3.20 0.23 8.83 0.66 5.53 0.19 4.08 0.61
Imports 2.74 0.91 2.42 0.80 3.13 1.05 1.75 0.58 4.89 1.63 2.90 0.84 2.47 0.99
Real exch. Rate 7.81 −1.51 7.66 −1.50 7.99 −1.52 7.29 −1.45 8.90 −1.61 8.05 −1.56 0.00 −1.42
Terms of trade 2.06 −0.41 1.84 −0.38 2.31 −0.44 1.33 −0.27 3.61 −0.66 2.43 −0.51 0.00 −0.25
Welfare (CE) 1.91 0.26 1.65 0.23 2.21 0.31 0.64 0.16 3.47 0.48 1.70 0.31 0.00 0.18
Euro area price and wage markups
Intertemp. elast. substitution Frisch labor elasticity Elast. subst. btw tradables
Benchmark Lower (1) Higher (3) Lower (0.33) Higher (0.99) Lower (1.5) Higher (5)
DE REA DE REA DE REA DE REA DE REA DE REA DE REA
Real GDP 9.19 9.22 8.47 8.50 10.11 10.13 7.03 7.06 13.99 14.02 9.16 9.19 9.24 9.27
Consumption 6.28 6.20 5.59 5.55 7.15 7.00 4.28 4.32 10.74 10.33 6.21 6.03 6.39 6.39
Investment 11.87 12.09 11.19 11.38 12.74 13.00 9.80 9.92 16.48 16.89 11.78 12.03 12.01 12.18
Hours worked 7.91 7.85 7.18 7.13 8.83 8.76 5.70 5.67 12.82 12.68 7.90 7.83 7.92 7.87
Real wage 7.25 7.07 7.28 7.13 7.19 6.99 7.40 7.33 6.92 6.53 7.18 6.92 7.34 7.24
Exports 5.65 4.40 4.99 3.74 6.50 5.24 3.64 2.40 10.13 8.85 5.91 4.70 5.20 3.98
Imports 4.63 3.13 4.05 2.66 5.36 3.72 2.95 1.79 8.37 6.11 4.75 3.09 4.39 3.11
Real exch. rate 4.43 5.84 4.31 5.68 4.57 6.04 4.06 5.39 5.24 6.83 4.57 6.04 4.21 5.59
Terms of trade 1.02 1.40 0.89 1.18 1.18 1.68 0.64 0.73 1.87 2.89 1.16 1.75 0.80 0.99
Welfare (CE) 2.57 2.43 2.22 2.12 3.02 2.81 1.06 1.05 4.70 4.23 2.50 2.27 2.68 2.61
DE=Germany; REA=Rest of euro area.
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5Figure 1. Services Market Reforms in Germany (domestic eﬀects).
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Horizontal axis: quarters. Vertical axis: percentage deviations from the baseline, except for inﬂation and
interest rates (annualized percentage-point deviations), and the trade balance-to-GDP ratio (percentage-
point deviations). GDP and its components are reported in real terms.
36Figure 2. Services Market Reforms in Germany (spillovers to rest of euro area).
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Horizontal axis: quarters. Vertical axis: percentage deviations from the baseline, except for inﬂation and
interest rates (annualized percentage-point deviations), and the trade balance-to-GDP ratio (percentage-
point deviations). GDP and its components are reported in real terms.
37Figure 3. Services Market Reforms in Germany (eﬀects on German trade variables).
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Horizontal axis: quarters. Vertical axis: percentage deviations from the baseline.
38Figure 4. Services Market Reforms in Germany (eﬀects on rest of euro area trade variables).
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Horizontal axis: quarters. Vertical axis: percentage deviations from the baseline.
39Figure 5. Labor Market Reforms in Germany (domestic eﬀects).
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Horizontal axis: quarters. Vertical axis: percentage deviations from the baseline, except for inﬂation and
interest rates (annualized percentage-point deviations), and the trade balance-to-GDP ratio (percentage-
point deviations). GDP and its components are reported in real terms.
40Figure 6. Labor Market Reforms in Germany (spillovers to rest of euro area).
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Horizontal axis: quarters. Vertical axis: percentage deviations from the baseline, except for inﬂation and
interest rates (annualized percentage-point deviations), and the trade balance-to-GDP ratio (percentage-
point deviations). GDP and its components are reported in real terms.
41Figure 7. Labor Market Reforms in Germany (eﬀects on German trade variables).
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Horizontal axis: quarters. Vertical axis: percentage deviations from the baseline.
42Figure 8. Labor Market Reforms in Germany (eﬀects on rest of euro area trade variables).





































Bilateral Real Exchange Rate (with US)







Bilateral Real Exchange Rate (with RW)






Bilateral Terms of Trade (with US)






Bilateral Terms of Trade (with RW)
Horizontal axis: quarters. Vertical axis: percentage deviations from the baseline.
43Figure 9. Labor and Services Reforms in Germany (domestic eﬀects).
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Horizontal axis: quarters. Vertical axis: percentage deviations from the baseline, except for inﬂation and
interest rates (annualized percentage-point deviations), and the trade balance-to-GDP ratio (percentage-
point deviations). GDP and its components are reported in real terms.
44Figure 10. Labor and Services Reforms in Germany (spillovers to rest of euro area).
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Horizontal axis: quarters. Vertical axis: percentage deviations from the baseline, except for inﬂation and
interest rates (annualized percentage-point deviations), and the trade balance-to-GDP ratio (percentage-
point deviations). GDP and its components are reported in real terms.
45Figure 11. Labor and Services Reforms in Germany (eﬀects on German trade variables).
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Horizontal axis: quarters. Vertical axis: percentage deviations from the baseline.
46Figure 12. Labor and Services Reforms in Germany (eﬀects on rest of euro area trade variables).
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Horizontal axis: quarters. Vertical axis: percentage deviations from the baseline.
47Figure 13. Labor and Services Reforms in the euro area (German eﬀects).
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Horizontal axis: quarters. Vertical axis: percentage deviations from the baseline, except for inﬂation and
interest rates (annualized percentage-point deviations), and the trade balance-to-GDP ratio (percentage-
point deviations). GDP and its components are reported in real terms.
48Figure 14. Labor and Services Reforms in the euro area (rest of euro area eﬀects).
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Horizontal axis: quarters. Vertical axis: percentage deviations from the baseline, except for inﬂation and
interest rates (annualized percentage-point deviations), and the trade balance-to-GDP ratio (percentage-
point deviations). GDP and its components are reported in real terms.
49Figure 15. Labor and Services Reforms in the euro area (eﬀects on German trade variables).
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50Figure 16. Labor and Services Reforms in the euro area (eﬀects on rest of euro area trade
variables).
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